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Chapter 9
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and the
Financial Crisis: Impact and Sponsors
and Government Reactions
Mark J. Warshawsky
The dramatic events of the global financial crisis and the great recession of
2008–9 affected many aspects of world economies, and corporate defined
benefit (DB) plans in the United States were no exception. The most
obvious and immediate impact showed up in plan funding rates: there
was a dramatic decline and then a more gradual rise in equity prices, along
with an initial large rise and then a gradual decline in corporate bond
yields. As yields fell, plan liabilities increased. The finances of the govern-
ment insurer of DB plans, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), also worsened. But the longer-term impact of the global financial
crisis is likely to be in the deeper appreciation of the high levels of risk
inherent in the external economic environment. In turn, this will shape the
long-term decision-making of corporate DB plan sponsors pertinent to
investment policies, contributions, and plan sponsorship and design, as
well as decisions by the federal government, including temporary funding
relief to plan sponsors.
This chapter discusses how corporate DB plans fared during the global
financial crisis, and how the main actors reacted. We begin with a detailed
time line of legislative and regulatory temporary funding relief. We also
review a reform proposal that arose out of this environment and experi-
ence recommending a new type of retirement plan and other changes in
government policies.
Background
To illustrate the backdrop against which this analysis unfolds, Figure 9.1
shows monthly and annual returns of the S&P500 for the period 2007–10, a
period that bookends the great recession that began in December 2007 and
ended in June 2009. The global financial crisis was most intense from
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
September 2008 through March 2009. Equity securities, represented by
the S&P500, are a major asset class for pension funds; because of their
generally high return, they also embody more risk. Figure 9.2 reports
yields on high-grade corporate bonds at month ends, again for 2007–10.
The series shown from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reflects a
composite of rates on high-grade corporate bonds fairly representative
of rates pension sponsors use for the purposes of financial accounting
(and, within a range, for legal funding requirements in calculating their
pension liabilities).
As the figures show, while equity returns were volatile in 2007, they were
modestly positive. Beginning in 2008, however, larger losses began to
accrue and September through November saw extremely large declines
in prices. For the year, losses reached nearly 40 percent. January and
February 2009 saw continued large losses, but then confidence was restored
in the financial markets and, overall, the equity market in 2009 had a gain
of more than 25 percent. There was continued volatility in 2010, but, on
net, there was again a gain at over 15 percent.
Yields on high-grade corporate bonds generally follow those on long-
maturity Treasury bonds, and were increasing through mid-year 2007 and
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Figure 9.1 Total index monthly and annual returns, S&P 500 (%): 2007–10
Source : Author’s computations using data from Haver DLX database, including monthly
returns for the S&P from the years of 2007 to the end of 2010.
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then began to decline with the onset of the recession. In 2008, however,
that relationship broke, as spreads widened dramatically. Treasury bond
yields fell while corporate bond yields rose dramatically in the depth of the
financial crisis to nearly 8 percent (end of October 2008): during this
period, investors doubted the creditworthiness of even the highest rated
corporate issuers. Thereafter, corporate yields declined (although there
was a bump-up in March 2009) until they were below 6 percent at the end
of 2009 and around 5.5 percent at the end of 2010. Spreads with Treasury
securities also narrowed significantly.
Impact on corporate pension-funding status
The funding status of DB plans is calculated as the ratio of the market value
of plan assets to liabilities (formally, the projected benefit obligation or
PBO) for financial accounting year-end disclosures. This is the most imme-
diate and sensitive summary measure of the plan’s benefit security level,
and it is widely cited and used. Figure 9.3 shows the history of the funding
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Figure 9.2 Composite Corporate Bond Rate (%): month-end, 2007–10
Source : Author’s computation from the Internal Revenue Service (2011).
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status of the DB plans of Fortune 1000 companies 2000–10, on an aggre-
gate basis (total of all plan assets divided by total of all plan liabilities) and
also as a simple average across the companies (average of individual
company pension asset–liability ratios). In 2000, the overall funding
status was quite high at 124 percent, but it dropped during the dot-com
bust, and the ensuing recession saw a low of 82 percent in 2002. Thereaf-
ter, there was a slow climb through 2007 when most plans were fully
funded, only to experience the dramatic falloff in 2008 to an aggregate
funding status of 77 percent and an average status of 70 percent. The
years 2009 and 2010 saw some modest improvement. Though discount
rates fell which boosted liabilities, there was also an increase in asset
values; the estimated aggregate status was 83 percent in 2010 and average
was 82 percent. Note that when the aggregate funding measure was
uniformly higher than the average, it meant that larger plans were better
funded than smaller plans.
A somewhat brighter view of the 2009–10 experience results from
examining funding patterns across companies for fiscal years 2008
through 2010 (Figure 9.4). In 2008, almost one-quarter of companies
had pension plans with a funding status of under 60 percent; by 2009,
this share had declined to 10 percent, and in 2010 it declined further to 7
percent. On the other end of the spectrum, only 4 percent of companies
had overfunded DB plans in 2008; by 2009, the percentage of overfunded
plans improved a bit, to over 5 percent, and in 2010, it jumped to
10 percent.
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Figure 9.3 Pension funding status for Fortune 1000 companies: percentage per
year 2000–10
Source : Author’s computations using data from Towers Watson; see text.
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Pension plan investments
Perhaps the easiest andmost direct way for a plan to control cost and risk in its
DB plan is through asset allocation. A higher allocation to equities not only
lowers the plan sponsor’s expected cost but also increases its risk, especially in
the sense of more volatile required cash contributions. When DB plans are
active and growing, equity investments make particularly good sense, as assets
that increasewith economic growthmatch liabilities that likewise increasewith
growth (more workers and higher wages). When DB plans are no longer
growing or are closed or frozen—and mainly pay out benefits—many experts
say that a better match is obtained when debt securities are the primary
investment. These considerations should hold regardless of whether there is
a bull or bear stock market. Even sophisticated professional and institutional
investors, however,might be influenced byunusual realizations of risk, such as
that which occurred during the global financial crisis. Overall, as we shall see,
there has been a movement away from equity investments for DB plans. This
pattern was apparent before the crisis, but it was deepened as a result.
Figure 9.5 shows the equity share for private DB plans from 1995 through
2010 taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts;1 the equity share for private
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
%
 o
f A
ss
et
s 
he
ld
 in
 e
qu
ity
Year
DB-equity DC-equity
Figure 9.5 Equity shares for private DB and DC plan assets: 1995–2009
Source : FRB (2011).
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defined contribution (DC) plans is also shown for comparison purposes.
The DB equity share rose steadily from about 52 percent in 1995 to nearly
70 percent in 2005. There was a slight decline in 2002, likely reflective of
equity price declines. Then, in 2006, the equity share for DB plans began
to decline, more significantly in 2007, dramatically in 2008, and again in
2009, to only about 48 percent. In 2010, it declined again to 45 percent.
While the decline in 2008 may be attributed at least in part to the massive
and sudden meltdown in the stock market in the fourth quarter, the
continued decline in share in 2009 and 2010 likely represents a conscious
decision to reduce risk-taking, as equity prices rose in most of 2009 and
2010. The different behavior seen for DC plans makes this interpretation
of a conscious move away from equities by DB plans more certain. While
asset allocation mutual funds like target-date and balance funds are
popular and growing, these still represent a distinct minority of assets
and investors in DC plans. And it appears that most DC plan participants
were passive investors and did not automatically rebalance their alloca-
tions. Indeed, the equity share in DC plans followed stock market move-
ments closely over time, with some hint of an upward secular trend in the
equity share. Overall, the equity share of DC plans has generally been
higher than for DB plans, and in 2010, it was almost 20 percentage points
higher than for DB plans.
Figure 9.6 shows a similar pattern based on data from large DB plan
corporate sponsor annual reports.2 In particular, the figure presents the
aggregate average and the distribution of equity shares among plan spon-
sors 2005–9. Allocations to equity from 2005 to 2008 decreased from 62 to
44 percent, and they only recovered slightly to 45 percent in 2009. As
further proof of the trend, fewer than 1 percent of large plan sponsors
allocated less than 20 percent to equity in 2005, whereas more than 5
percent invested less than 20 percent in equities in 2008. Similarly, at nearly
the other end of the spectrum, almost 9 percent of plan sponsors held
75–80 percent of plan assets in equities in 2005, but by 2009, fewer than
1 percent did so.
According to McFarland and Warshawsky (2010), other information
sources indicate that equities have been a source of funding for both
debt and alternative investments such as hedge funds and real estate in
pension plans. More broadly, investment consultants in this field have been
urging for some time that sponsors consider the liability structures of their
plans and reduce risk, for example, through liability-directed investing,
and this message is apparently getting through. Also, as McFarland and
Warshawsky find, closed and frozen plans invest somewhat less in equities
and more in debt securities; as such plans increase in number, aggregate
allocations will also change in that direction.
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Contribution patterns
Another way in which DB sponsors can react to financial market develop-
ments is through employer contributions to help fund the plan. The
federal government sets a lower bound to these contributions, which it
moves from time to time (Warshawsky, 2007). In particular, the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) implemented a regime whereby market
conditions were ultimately better reflected in plans’ regulatory funded
status, and minimum required contributions were linked more explicitly
and quickly to that status than in the past. These requirements are quite
complex, and during the global financial crisis, they were temporarily
altered to reduce the otherwise large minimum contributions that would
otherwise have been required. At the same time, plan sponsors can con-
tribute more than the minimum if it fits their business strategy and finan-
cial wherewithal; one of the accomplishments of PPA was to allow these
extra contributions on a tax-deductible basis to a much greater extent than
did prior law. Contributions can be either cash or employer securities (the
latter within legal limits), but in practice the vast majority of contributions
are made in cash.3 There is evidence that many plan sponsors do pursue
the strategy of contributing more than the minimum required.
Table 9.1 shows employer DB plan contributions by Fortune 1000 com-
panies. These are mainly for single-employer qualified DB plans in the
United States (though they also include non-qualified executive DB plans
and foreign DB plans). The advantage of this data series, compared to the
Form 5500 filed by individual plans with the federal government, is that it is
available more quickly. Here, we see that contributions do follow plans’
current funded status. In 1999, plan sponsors only contributed about $11
Table 9.1 Employer contributions to corporate DB plans by Fortune 1000
companies: 1999–2009 ($000 nominal)
Fiscal year
1999 $10,760,323
2000 $16,685,625
2001 $13,856,128
2002 $44,351,971
2003 $71,950,882
2004 $52,305,607
2005 $55,333,997
2006 $44,775,654
2007 $33,187,663
2008 $35,920,612
2009 $60,459,778
Source : Author’s computations of data from Towers Watson.
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billion, but by 2003, contributions rose to nearly $72 billion. Contributions
then declined, and by 2007 had reached $33 billion. In 2008, they rose to
$36 billion and in 2009 to more than $60 billion. As explained below,
contribution levels in 2008 and 2009 are clearly above the minimum
required by law.4
DB plan sponsorship and design
The long-term trend in sponsorship of active DB plans by large corporations
represented here by the list of Fortune 100 companies from 1998 through
May of 2011 appears in Table 9.2. These are, in turn, divided into traditional
final-average-pay and career-average-pay plans on the one hand, and hybrid
plans, mainly cash balance plans, on the other. Clearly, since 2004 the trend
has been away from DB plans, particularly traditional plans. Although the
trend continued and even accelerated in subsequent years, we do not sense
that the global financial crisis per se caused that acceleration, despite the
rapid drop-off in funded status in 2008 and increase in future funding
obligations. Rather, it appears to be a continuation of a preexisting trend.
Pension plans in the United States are long-term commitments of the plan
sponsor, by law and practice. Particularly for large corporations, they repre-
sent an important part of the compensation structure and a tool for work-
force management, especially regarding turnover and retirement rates.
Accordingly, there are many considerations when closing or freezing a DB
plan, beyond the plan’s current financial status. Moreover, because pension
plans have a ‘long tail’ in terms of liabilities, even freezing all accruals
immediately will not reduce a sponsor’s risk exposure much for several
years. Indeed, McFarland et al. (2009) showed that the announcement of a
freeze or close generally led to slightly lower share prices for the plan sponsor,
rather than an increase. Standard terminations of plans will take the risks off
the books of plan sponsors, but they are expensive: the funding gaps must be
made up immediately, and the extra charges by the insurer issuers of group
annuity contracts to take on the accrued pension liabilities must be paid.
The obverse of risk exposure to the plan sponsor is risk protection for
employees who better appreciate DB plans after a financial crisis (Towers
Watson, 2010a). Moreover, once a decision has been made to move away
from the DB plan, it may take several months or even years before it is
implemented, owing to administrative, legal, and labor relations issues that
must be managed. So there is reason to expect no sudden movements in
DB plan sponsorship trends owing to the global financial crisis. Neverthe-
less, market events that highlight risk are likely to have an impact eventu-
ally. Prior to the financial crisis, plan sponsors said ‘risk’ was the most
important reason given for a plan freeze or close (Watson Wyatt Worldwide,
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
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2008). By all accounts, the global financial crisis was a realization of risk far
beyond normal expectations—considerably beyond one standard deviation.
Accordingly, ways to reduce risk while keeping the essence of the DB plan are
likely to be more seriously explored and perhaps adopted.
Plan design is yet another important option for risk management (Pang
and Warshawsky, 2011b). Cash balance hybrid plans represent less risk to a
plan sponsor than traditional DB plans, in that for the latter, liabilities
fluctuate with salary increases and service years. Moreover, these liabilities
are also highly sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, liability
variations are mitigated in cash balance plans by their accrual formulas:
usually the cash balance benefits are expressed as account balances at
retirement, and the pay credit rate is fixed (e.g. 6 percent of pay). Cash
balance accruals do vary with new realizations of crediting interest rates; for
instance, the thirty-year Treasury bond yield is a frequently used crediting
rate. In addition, liabilities for cash balance accounts are typically less
interest rate-sensitive because the duration is shorter (account balances
are usually paid out as a lump sum upon termination or retirement) and
because of the internal partial hedging of the benefit accrual (being
dependent on interest rate levels) and the liability. For example, declines
in discount rates will not only increase the computed liability of a cash
balance plan, but also gradually reduce plan benefits through lower inter-
est credits. Pang and Warshawsky conclude that the cash balance plan has
less expected volatility than the traditional DB plan and only slightly higher
average cost, for the same 60/40 equity/bond investment strategy.
This lower risk may explain why hybrid plans have maintained a steadier
share of plan sponsorship than traditional DB plans for Fortune 100
companies. The legitimization of these plans by PPA, after years of legal
and political controversy, undoubtedly also played a part in steadying the
overall environment for their sponsorship (Clark et al., 2012).
Temporary funding relief from the government
As the depth and extent of the global financial crisis became apparent in
late 2008, many policymakers, plan sponsors, pension community leaders,
and analysts began to worry about the impact of the drop in equity values
and interest rates on the funded status of single-employer DB plans.5 In
particular, at a time of massive layoffs, hiring freezes, and the big drop in
corporate plant and equipment investment, they grew concerned about
the call on corporate cash arising from the impact of the legal funding
obligations under PPA requirements. These requirements, first imposed
for 2008 plan years, require the plan sponsor to face a seven-year amortiza-
tion period for measured funding losses. These funding losses, in turn, are
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broadly reflective of market conditions for both asset and liability values.
There are, however, many transition rules, and special definitions, includ-
ing some allowed smoothing of values and so on, that make an accurate
picture of the actual law requirements quite complicated, as we shall see
later. Indeed, this complexity is a key part of the story of how temporary
funding relief was accomplished in various stages.
The first response to the crisis was to provide some limited relief as part of a
legislative package of technical corrections to PPA, through the Worker,
Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA, 2008). To avoid a
cliff-like effect funding requirement, this new bill relaxed PPA’s transition
rule for phasing in liability targets, and it allowed a look back for the restric-
tion on benefit accruals on severely underfunded plans. In addition,WRERA
allowed plans to use twenty-five-month asset-smoothing with an assumed
earnings rate to determine the actuarial value of assets, generally increasing
values.6 This technical change, while directly of relatively small consequence,
did later allow regulators to grant significantly more temporary relief.
Pang and Warshawsky (2009b) estimated that for the 2008 plan year (for
most plans, at the end of calendar year 2007), the average regulatory
funded status was 97 percent and the aggregate of minimum required
contributions was $38 billion. But this relatively benign situation was up-
ended by the financial crisis: for the 2009 plan year, they projected that the
average funded status had declined to 75 percent and contributions would
increase dramatically to $125 billion under PPA. Some relief was provided
by WRERA; because of it, required contributions were projected to be
instead $108 billion. The 2010 plan year was likely to be extremely chal-
lenging, as the average funded status would only improve to 80 percent and
required contributions to $103 billion.7
With the passage of WRERA, plan sponsors lobbied the IRS to allow for
changes in valuation elections, arguing that (had they been aware of the
law change) they would have made different elections in 2008.8 These
allowances for different valuation methodologies improved the average
funded status to 94 percent in 2009 and reduced the required contribution
to only $32 billion (Pang and Warshawsky, 2009c). In plan year 2010, it was
anticipated that average funded status would be 84 percent and required
contribution would be $89 billion. These figures, of course, represent
considerable improvements and relief compared to the situation as pro-
jected in January 2009. Yet plan year 2010 still represented a large increase
in required contributions, and plan year 2011 a massive increase. The
average funded status was expected to fall to 77 percent and required
contributions jump to $147 billion in 2011 (Pang and Warshawsky, 2009c).
This led plan sponsors and their trade groups to seek further temporary
relief. Eventually, Congress assembled a package that was responsive to
sponsor concerns, including extending the time period of relief, but it was
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
DB Pension Plans 173
still only limited and conditional. This legislation, called the Access to Care
for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010 (ACMBPRA),
was signed by President Obama in 2010. Under ACMBPRA, sponsors of
underfunded DB plans may elect either a ‘2+7’ rule or a fifteen-year
amortization rule for losses incurred in any two plan years between 2008
and 2011. Under the 2+7 rule, the sponsor makes interest-only payments
for two years, followed by the regular seven-year amortization schedule.
Under the fifteen-year rule, the sponsor amortizes the funding shortfall
over fifteen years. Also, the relief from freezing benefit accruals for severely
underfunded plans was extended to the 2010 plan year. The legislation
conditioned this relief, however, on a so-called cash flow rule, that is, relief
recipients must make higher pension contributions if they pay ‘excess’
employee compensation, declare extraordinary dividends, or redeem com-
pany stock in excess of certain thresholds. The condition period is three
years for the 2+7 rule and five years for the fifteen-year rule.
Models of the relief provisions using updated market conditions and
assumptions suggested that if all underfunded plan sponsors chose the 2+7
rule for the 2010 and 2011 plan years, then required contributions would
be only $66 billion in 2010 and $96 billion in 2011, a reduction of $47
billion for those two years compared to pre-ACMBPRA law (Pang and
Warshawsky, 2010). By 2012, however, required contributions would
jump to $147 billion in this scenario. By contrast, election of the fifteen-
year amortization by all underfunded plans for the 2010 and 2011 plan
years would provide lesser relief in 2010–11 but more through 2013—a $63
billion reduction in required contributions over the longer period.
Subsequent surveys have indicated that the extent of utilization by plan
sponsors of the latest legislative relief will be somewhat limited (Towers
Watson, 2010b). Only about 30 percent of plans will use any relief, although
the more severely underfunded plans are more likely to do so. Of those
electing relief, most will use the fifteen-year amortization rule for the 2010
and 2011 plan years, which maximizes the longer-term relief but minimizes
the immediate impact. The cash flow rule conditions are apparently dis-
couraging some sponsors; with economic and financial conditions finally
improving in late 2010 and early 2011, other plan sponsors preferred to bite
the bullet and make extra contributions to improve funding status.
On updating the projections in January 2011, Pang and Warshawsky
(2011a) included actual contributions in 2008 and 2009 (Table 9.3) and
discovered that contributions were considerably in excess of the minimum
required contributions. Nevertheless, declines in interest rates during 2010
worsened projected funding and increased required contributions com-
pared to earlier projections. Indeed, in the 2011 plan year, required con-
tributions increased to $163 billion, and to $175 billion in 2012, before
declining to still high levels of $149 billion in 2013 and $136 billion in 2014,
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without considering funding relief (Panel A). Because of the limited take-
up of any of the relief choices, the 2010 legislative relief is not projected to
have much of an impact on these numbers (Panel B).9
The PBGC single-employer insurance program
The corporate DB pension sector in the United States is protected by the
PBGC. For several reasons, it is to be expected that the global financial
crisis would have hurt this entity’s assets and liabilities, and also increased
the number of terminated underfunded DB pension plans resulting from
corporate bankruptcies. This did occur, but perhaps to a lesser extent than
what one might have expected given the severity of losses in financial
markets and the depth of the overall recession.
Table 9.4 shows the net position of the PBGC single-employer insurance
program, defined as the difference between its total assets and total liabil-
ities, from 2001 through 2010 (fiscal years). Assets are mainly investment
funds controlled by the PBGC, amassed over the years from the assumption
of corporate plans terminated in distress. Similarly, liabilities are mainly
the present value of future benefits accumulated over the years from
terminated plans. From 2007 to 2010, the net position of the program
declined from $13.1 billion to $21.6 billion. This was indeed a worsen-
ing in the financial situation of the program to be sure, but not nearly the
extent of decline as occurred from2001 to 2004, from$7.7 billion (a surplus!)
to $23.3 billion, nor reaching as deep a level, even though the program’s
exposure rose over time due to growing corporate pension liabilities.
This cushioning of the PBGC financial situation in 2008 and 2009 can be
explained in part by the extraordinary support given by the federal
Table 9.4 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) single-employer
insurance program: net position, 2001–10 ($m)
Fiscal year Total assets Total liabilities Net position
2001 $21,768 14,036 7,732
2002 $25,430 29,068 (3,638)
2003 $34,016 45,254 (11,238)
2004 $38,993 62,298 (23,305)
2005 $56,470 79,246 (22,776)
2006 $59,972 78,114 (18,142)
2007 $67,241 80,352 (13,111)
2008 $64,612 75,290 (10,678)
2009 $68,736 89,813 (21,077)
2010 $77,827 99,421 (21,594)
Source : Author’s computations from PBGC Annual Reports (2001–10).
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government and the Federal Reserve to specific financial and nonfinancial
companies in severe distress during the recent global financial crisis. As-
sisted companies thereby avoided the need to turn over their underfunded
pension plans to the PBGC. The entity’s change in net position can be
explained more specifically by the finances of annual operations shown in
Table 9.5 for fiscal years 2007–10. Premiums plus investment income (or
less losses) less actuarial charges (or plus credits) less losses from com-
pleted and probable terminations (or plus credits) less administrative and
investment expenses equals the net income (loss) for the year; this is
identical to the change in net position. Premium income, owing to a
provision in PPA, now increases when the funded status of corporate
pension plans deteriorates; this was evident in 2009 and 2010, when pre-
miums paid to the PBGC nearly doubled. Investment income reflects the
performance of the PBGC portfolio; as we will see in the next table, the
portfolio does include equity holdings, as well as debt and cash, and
therefore is subject to financial market fluctuations. Returns were negative
in 2008 and positive in 2009 and 2010.
Actuarial charges should generally be positive, owing to the passage of
time, but in fact they show big swings across the zero line over time, mainly
caused by changes in the discount rate applied to the calculation of the
present value of future benefits owed by the PBGC. This volatility was
particularly evident in 2009, and losses from terminations were also sub-
stantial that year. It should be noted, however, that, complying with gener-
ally accepted accounting rules, the PBGC reflects probable terminations of
underfunded plans on its books and sometimes reverses those entries when
specific corporate financial situations turn around unexpectedly.
Table 9.6 provides us with some key indicators for the PBGC single-
employer insurance program, including the number of underfunded plans
newly terminated and the net loss in billions from actual plan terminations
Table 9.5 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) single-employer
insurance: annual operations, 2007–10 ($m)
Fiscal year
2010 2009 2008 2007
Premium and other income $2,261 $1,838 $1,363 $1,531
Investment income (loss) 7,594 6,330 (4,164) 4,737
Actuarial charges and adjustments (credits) 9,421 13,901 (4,813) 346
Losses (credits) from completed and probable
terminations
509 4,234 (826) 399
Administrative, investment, and other expenses 442 432 405 492
Net income (loss) (517) (10,399) 2,433 5,031
Source : Author’s computations using data from PBGC (2007–10).
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that year. These indicators clearly worsened in 2009–10. Another critical
determinant is the interest rate factor used in valuing PBGC liabilities. As the
interest rate factor declined from6.66 percent in 2008 to 4.41 percent in 2010,
the value of PBGC liabilities (which have long durations) increased
substantially.
It should also be noted that the PBGC changed its valuation methodol-
ogy during this period. Currently, the PBGC surveys life insurance industry
group annuity indicated prices through the American Council of Life
Insurers (ACLI) to obtain input needed to determine interest factors
used in valuing pension liabilities and then derives interest factors that
will best match the prices from the surveys. Despite its importance to the
reported net position of the program, that survey apparently is not audited
by the PBGC’s accounting firm. Further, the prices from the survey are not
necessarily reflective of actual market transactions, nor is the sample of
companies surveyed necessarily large and consistent. Prior to 2009, the
PBGC had also used an aggregate bond index in ‘the mix’ of its determin-
ation of interest factors, but it discontinued that practice because ‘signifi-
cant volatility in the bond markets led PBGC to research the relationship
between quarterly bond yields and annuity prices’ (PBGC, 2010: 67).
In January 2006, with a change in mortality tables (due to lower mortality
rates), the PBGC increased its interest factors by 170 basis points. Compar-
ing PBGC rates with corporate bond rates over the period 2001–10, two
distinct periods are notable. During 2001–5, PBGC rates were lower but
they were highly correlated (R2 = 0.9151) with market rates measured by
the Composite Corporate Bond Rate (CCBR). In the second period, how-
ever, the correlation with market rates is much lower (R2 = 0.6509), while
PBGC rates are still below the CCBR. Warshawsky (2009) has suggested that
the PBGC should instead use the corporate bond yield curve calculated by
the TreasuryDepartment and employed bymany corporate pension plans, as
the basis for the calculation of its pension liabilities. This may be a more
Table 9.6 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) single-employer insurance
program: key indicators
Fiscal year
2010 2009 2008
New underfunded plans terminated 147 144 67
Net loss from terminations ($b) 1.44 5.83 0.27
Interest rate factor (%) 4.41 5.17 6.66
Return on investment portfolio (%) 12.1 13.2 6.5
Equity share in investment portfolio (%) 31.1 37.2 27
Source : Author’s computations using data from PBGC (2008–10).
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transparent and accurate methodology in the determination of interest rate
factors underlying reasonable estimates of current group annuity prices.
As also seen in Figure 9.7, the return on the PBGC investment portfolio is
somewhat volatile and reflects financial market conditions. During 2008–9,
the PBGC increased its exposure to the equity market, but then in 2010
it brought that exposure back down. These changes reflect mainly changes
in the PBGC Board’s investment policy determined by its trustees, the
Secretaries of Labor, Treasury and Commerce, and as suggested by the
Executive Director.
The 2012 proposed federal government budget released by President
Obama in February 2011 included a plan to increase PBGC premiums to
make them reflect the riskiness of the pension plan and the plan sponsor,
and to give the PBGC Board the authority to set the premium rate. The
budget indicated that this proposal would raise $16 billion over ten years,
although it would not start for two years. Assuming that the stated increase
in revenues represented just an increase in premiums (no details were
given), this would represent nearly a doubling in annual premiums from
current levels.
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Reform proposals
Another way to reduce risk imposed on plan sponsors is to change certain
laws that currently constrain risk management in, and therefore increase
the risk of, DB plans. Indeed, in light of the global financial crisis, several
analysts have recently put forward reform proposals to better enable the
management and sharing of risk between plan sponsors and participants.
For example, the Society of Actuaries Retirement 20/20 initiative spon-
sored a conference in 2010 where several proposals were presented, em-
phasizing new third-party institutions and the DC approach (Kessler and
Peterson, 2010).
Another such proposal offers a new type of single- or multiple-employer
retirement plan, namely something called a flexible structured plan (War-
shawsky, 2010). It has the basic features of a DB plan, but the plan sponsor
can cut back benefits according to a specified legal rule if the plan funding
falls severely, and it must increase benefits if plan funding rises signifi-
cantly. No reversion of excess assets would be allowed here. This type of
plan is intended to share investment risk and return between employers
and employees. The proposal would also apply a uniform standard of
benefit adequacy on plan design and operation based on certified retire-
ment saving models, with appropriate differentiation for the different plan
types, with the structure intended to encourage guaranteed benefits. Non-
discrimination requirements could then be eliminated as essentially redun-
dant, according to the proposal. Other changes in plan rules and
provisions include a reform of the reversion tax for DB (both traditional
and hybrid) plans, intended to right the risk imbalance inherent in the
sponsorship of these plans currently. Additionally, PBGC accounting for its
liabilities would be revamped, to improve transparency. The various limits
on benefits and contributions to plans would be indexed to wages, rather
than prices—it is claimed that this is policy consistent with sensible plan
design because plans are intended to replace preretirement wages, not
prices, and because the relative position of plan limits in the income
distribution is more likely to be maintained, rather than slowly erode,
keeping the active interest of sponsor owners and executives.
Role of the employer
Unlike some other recent proposals, this proposal builds on the current
employer-based system; accordingly, the current voluntary nature of the
second-tier retirement system would continue. Retirement plan sponsor-
ship would not be required by employers, nor would a plan need to be fully
paid by employers. Accordingly, incentives under the proposal are de-
signed to be consistent with the encouragement of plan sponsorship, as
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well as adequate and secure benefits; the goal is to produce a level playing
field among plan types, while assuring plan participants and broader
society that their needs and concerns are also addressed. An important
consideration and even constraint for its success would be a continued
sustainable interest by employers in retirement plans.
The flexible structure plan has the basic features of a DB plan and therefore
the retirement benefits would be specified. The sponsor, however, would
be allowed to implement certain specified benefit cutbacks, across the
board in percentage terms, to all participants not currently receiving pay-
ments from the plan or not older than the plan’s normal retirement age,
from the currently indicated level of benefits, if the plan funding, specially
defined, fell below certain thresholds. As a counterpart, plan improve-
ments, again distributed evenly and proportionately across the board to
participants not receiving benefits, would be required from the current
benefit level if the plan funding increased above certain thresholds. No
reversions of excess pension assets would be allowed for this plan type.
Any unilateral or bargained improvements in future benefit accruals for
a flexible structure plan, unrelated to funding status, could be made
proportionally among participants, not favoring any group, on a going-
forward basis. Benefit improvements for past service, however, could only
be made if they were funded fully. Benefit cutbacks would not be allowed
except in response to declines in funding status.
For this purpose, funded status would be defined as the ratio of plan
assets to plan liabilities, where the present value of benefits accrued to
participants receiving payments or older than the plan’s retirement age is
subtracted from both the numerator and denominator. Plan assets and
liabilities would otherwise follow the definitions and valuation require-
ments in current law.
The cutback–enhancement regime for this plan type has several ele-
ments. Within a corridor of funding statuses around the current plan
liability (say, 80–120 percent), the current funding requirements operate;
that is, normal cost must be covered, any shortfalls must be amortized over
seven years, but no benefit improvements are required. The corridor
provides stability of benefits to plan participants most of the time, while
imposing only modest volatility on plan sponsors. If the funding status were
to fall below the corridor, the benefit liability may be reduced, according to
a rule considered below (flexible). Normal cost is still paid, and the
corridor is reset around the new liability. Benefit reductions are limited:
if the current liability falls below 50 percent of the initial liability, there can
be no further cuts, and contributions must be made to amortize losses so
that at least 50 percent of the initial liability will be paid to plan partici-
pants. Above the corridor, benefit improvements must be made, again
according to one of the rules discussed below; the rules generally give
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symmetrical treatment to cuts and improvements. The new liability is
calculated and the corridor is moved around it. Finally, normal cost relates
to the current accruals of the plan, which are dependent on the plan’s
fixed design (structured) and not to its funding status. The plan would
offer a life annuity as a distribution option.
Contributions would be made by the employer in the new plan type.
Mandatory employee contributions would not be allowed because the
participants do not control the plan investments. As a retirement instru-
ment where the worker shares to some extent the results of the plan’s
performance, voluntary employee contributions to the plan would be
allowed to purchase extra benefits, on a tax-deductible basis, comparable
to the treatment of 401(k) plans.
This proposal considers alternative cutback–enhancement rules (re-
gimes), with somewhat different risk-sharing properties. One possibility
would set the corridor at 80–120 percent; if outside the corridor, cuts and
increases in benefits would be made pari-passu with funding status changes
below or above the corridor (i.e. according to the distance outside the
corridor). For example, if the funding status fell to 75 percent of
the current liability, a 5 percent cut could be made to the benefits, and the
corridor would move downward around the new, lower benefit liability.
Normal cost must be paid, as well as any amortizations of past losses. Cuts
may continue to be made, as warranted by funding status changes, but
benefits cannot fall below 50 percent of the initial promise. If the funding
status rose to, say, 130 percent, a 10 percent ‘permanent’ increase to benefits
must bemade, and the corridor wouldmove upward around the new benefit
liability.10 It is therefore argued that this change could reduce the risk
inherent in the sponsorship of these plans currently, perhaps renewing the
interest by plan sponsors in DB plans. In the context of the overall proposal,
the change in excise tax is intended to help achieve ‘an even playing field’ in
the costs, burdens, and advantages for sponsors and participants among the
three plan types in the new, reformed, retirement system.
The team has also explored having the PBGC use market interest rates as
the discount rate used to value its obligations (instead of the current
practice of basing it on insurance industry surveys). Specifically, the idea
is to use the high-grade corporate bond spot ‘yield’ curve calculated by the
Treasury Department in a highly transparent manner, with appropriate
adjustments for agency expenses, to arrive at good estimates of group
annuity prices and to be used in calculating the finances of the PBGC,
both income statement and balance sheet. The purpose of this change is to
bring more transparency and accuracy to the accounting for the insurance
program. And finally, the proposal posits that the indexation of the various
limits on all types of qualified retirement plans should be made to the
average wage computed by Social Security, rather than the consumer price
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index. In addition, levels should be increased as Social Security is
reformed, presumably becoming even more progressive, to maintain a
fair balance between public and private programs for retirement.
Conclusion
The global financial crisis hit corporate DB pension plans hard. Asset
values declined dramatically as the stock market was shocked in late 2008
and early 2009. Interest rates used to value pension liabilities rose initially
in late 2008, but then they declined steadily over the next two years. As a
result, the funding status of plans declined quickly, from 106 percent in
2007 to 77 percent in 2008, before recovering somewhat to 83 percent in
2010. Plan sponsors curtailed their investment portfolio risk (moving away
from equities), increased contributions (even above legal minimums), and
froze and closed traditional DB plans, continuing trends already evident
before the financial crisis. The federal government provided several types
of funding relief, both legislative and regulatory. Some reforms were sub-
stantial, for the 2009 plan year in particular, in that even the high level of
contributions actually made was below what would otherwise have been
required. In any case, the relief was temporary, and required contributions
will increase significantly in the foreseeable future unless discount rates rise
significantly or asset markets boom.
Clearly, there remains much risk and fragility in financial markets and
the economy, perhaps more than countenance prior to the global financial
crisis. Plan sponsors are reluctant to bear the entire risk burden, yet work-
ers and retirees still want structured benefits and desire guaranteed bene-
fits. Accordingly, to encourage the activities of plan sponsors, and to better
manage risk, fairly and efficiently, while still providing structured benefits
to workers, it is useful to evaluate new plan designs that can more fairly and
efficiently spread the risk burden between sponsors and workers. Ultim-
ately, the goal would be to ensure that workers can retire at appropriate
ages in reasonable comfort and at reasonable cost.
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Endnotes
1. Two fairly ready and current sources of information exist on investment patterns of
private DB (and defined contribution or DC) plans. The first, from the Flows of
Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB, 2011), provides data on flows
andoutstanding amounts, by asset classes, on a quarterly basis. As of this writing, the
most recent data available is for third quarter 2010. A drawback to this source is that
single-employer and multiemployer plans are reported together, although assets of
single-employer plans generally represent more than three-quarters of the total for
DB plans. Another drawback is that these data are estimated from various underly-
ing sources; the estimates change for several quarters until no further revisions are
made. The second information source, from disclosures in the annual financial
reports of corporate plan sponsors, provides detailed data on asset holdings by class
and valuation methodology on an annual basis. Recent changes in financial
accounting standards made these disclosures more granular and accurate. Yet one
drawback is that the data are reported and collected with a lag; another is that the
collections donot represent the universe of single-employer plans. As of this writing,
themost recent financial disclosure data are available for year-end 2009 for Fortune
1000 companies (collected by Towers Watson). Despite their differences, the two
sources are largely consistent in the story they tell about trends, changes, and the
influence of the global financial crisis on DB plan investments.
2. These are the Fortune 1000 companies with calendar-year financial statements
for which Towers Watson has consistently obtained data.
3. Kummernuss et al. (2010) offer evidence that contributions of employer secur-
ities actually declined during the global financial crisis.
4. Data on contributions actually made on which we base our modeling of future
funding obligations come from Schedule SB of the Form 5500 through 2008 for
the universe of plans; for 2009, it is from the financial disclosure data for larger
companies reported above, adjusted for average relationships with the Schedule
SB data.
5. See Mazo and Greenblum (2012) for a discussion of the impact of the financial
crisis on multiemployer pensions.
6. This smoothing is somewhat limited though, such that the assumed earnings
rate cannot exceed the third segment rate mandated by PPA for valuing benefits
starting in fifteen or more years, and overall computed values are subject to the
asset corridor test; that is, that the actuarial asset value must fall within 90–110
percent of the fair market value.
7. Pang and Warshawsky (2009b) assume that most plan sponsors elected to use
the market value of assets in their required funding calculation and a smoothed
actuarial value of liabilities (as allowed by PPA), using three segment discount
rates averaged over the past twenty-four months. This is because plan sponsors
did not want to use the simple twenty-five-month average of past asset values
without also gaining the ability to assume some expected investment return over
the averaging period on the expectation that generally market prices, particu-
larly of equities, tend to rise over time. So, according to the model, the WRERA
provision allowing asset smoothing then had little direct impact on expected
funding obligations, without an ability to switch valuation methodologies. If,
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however, plan sponsors would switch their valuation elections to maximize asset
values and minimize liability values, funding obligations for the 2009 plan year
would be considerably reduced. In particular, smoothed asset values and mar-
ket value of liabilities (using the temporarily high corporate bond yields as of
October and November 2008) would provide considerable funding relief.
Under law and regulation, sponsors are generally only allowed to change
valuation elections once every five years without permission from the IRS;
hence, Pang and Warshawsky initially assumed that plan sponsors would be
reluctant to choose such a ‘mismatched’ valuation methodology, part
smoothed and part market, and to be locked in to that choice. Choosing
consistent valuations (all smoothed or all market, but mostly all smoothed),
these methodologies were estimated to improve the average funded status to 80
percent in plan year 2009 and to 85 percent in plan year 2010, and to reduce
required contributions to $91 billion in 2009 and to $84 billion in 2010.
8. In March 2009, the IRS announced that plans would be allowed to make a
change, without the need to ask for permission from the IRS, so that ‘for a
calendar year plan with a January 1, 2009 valuation date, the IRS will not
challenge the use of the monthly yield curve for January 2009, or any of the
four months immediately preceding January 2009’. In September 24, 2009, the
IRS said that regulations would provide for ‘automatic approval for a new
choice of interest rates for the first plan year beginning in 2010’. Hence,
according to internal Watson Wyatt surveys, most plan sponsors felt comfort-
able in choosing a smoothed asset valuation and market liability valuation for
the 2009 plan year, with the ability to switch again in 2010 or later.
9. It should also be noted that multiemployer plans were also subject to new PPA
requirements and got considerable funding relief (Mazo and Greenblum, 2012).
10. A specific provision in the overall proposal intended to encourage the mainte-
nance of guaranteed DB plans (not applied to flexible structured plans) is also
modeled by Pang and Warshawsky (2009a), which would lower the excise tax
rate to 20 percent (instead of the current 50 percent) and allow excess asset
reversions to employers for DB plans funded at least at 120 percent of their
liabilities. As in current law, sponsors would have to fully vest accrued benefits if
they took reversions, though they would not have to terminate their plans. Also,
the proposal includes a lower excise tax rate—15 percent—on asset reversions
in bankruptcy, instead of the 20 percent under current law. The excise tax rate
chosen reflects some past research that finds the rate needed to capture the
corporate income tax otherwise avoided by the exclusion of pension fund
investment income from taxation. Corporate income taxes would also need to
be paid on the asset reversions. The model results indicate that a more moder-
ate excise tax rate together with a reasonable funding threshold for asset
reversions would enable sponsors to spend the excess funds on other corporate
needs, thereby lowering the cost of sponsorship of DB plans. It would also open
a considerable revenue source for the government, with only a small increase in
bankruptcy cost for the PBGC.
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